This paper presents a positive economic model with which to describe interest groups' proposals in deliberative and accommodative agency rulemaking, particularly the type of rulemaking that requires the groups to discuss with each other and to propose their preferred policy implementation details before the agency finalizes the rulemaking on the basis of the proposals. Each interest group balances two factors in its proposal: (i) a greater rent that can be produced by making a proposal that is more advantageous to itself while being more aggressive toward its rival; and (ii) a greater political effort required to eliminate the rival's greater political resistance to that proposal. Then the agency establishes a policy on the basis of its judgment of the groups' proposals; its bias in the judgment is known to the interest groups a priori. The analysis suggests that an increase in the political effectiveness of either interest group makes both of them less polarized in their proposals, resulting in lower political costs associate with the proposal politics. An extension of this finding is that a consensus over a policy can be reached a priori by the two groups if both of them are sufficiently effective in politics. This generic model is then stylistically applied to the recent shareholder incentive rulemaking for California energy efficiency programs. We suggest that proposals made by interest groups in agency rulemaking can be an appropriate medium to develop a broader theory of policy decision making.
Introduction
How can we interpret the proposals made by interest groups during an agency rulemaking process? To what extent, do they reflect the groups' genuine preferences? What other factors may determine the groups' proposals? While scholars have been fascinated by the idea that organized interests struggle to influence policy decision making (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983; Austen-Smith & Wright, 1992; Furlong & Kerwin, 2004; Carpenter, 2004; McKay and Yackee, 2007) , there has been virtually no progress in understanding how the proposals made by interest groups during policymaking processes come into being. Specifically, no previous study has examined the interest groups' proposals in terms of their rent-seeking activities, competitive positions, political clout, or the characteristics of the policymakers.
In this paper, we present a positive economic model that describes interest groups' proposals during deliberative and accommodative policymaking processes. In particular, we focus on proposal-based rulemaking, a common class of agency rulemaking processes that require interest groups to discuss with each other and to propose their preferred policy implementation details before the agency finalizes the rulemaking on the basis of the proposals. Each interest group in our model balances two factors in its proposal: (i) a greater rent that can be produced by making a proposal that is more advantageous to itself while being more aggressive toward its rival; and (ii) a greater political effort required to eliminate the rival's greater political resistance to that proposal. Then the agency establishes a policy on the basis of its judgment of the groups' proposals; its bias in the judgment is known to the interest groups a priori. The proposal decision is modelled as a game between two groups with conflicting interests, in which each group seeks to influence the policy decision made by the predisposed agency. The principal issues addressed in this setting concern how two groups with conflicting interests will propose if either of them becomes more effective in politics or if the agency signals more bias toward either of the two parties' proposals.
The analysis yields the proposition that an increase in the political effectiveness of either interest group makes both of them less polarized in their equilibrium proposals, resulting in lower political costs associated with the proposal politics. An extension of this finding is that a consensus over a policy can be reached a priori by the two groups if both of them are sufficiently effective in politics. This proposition is contrary to the conventional wisdom that more effective interest-group politics will lead to greater polarization in their proposals and greater political costs during rulemaking processes.
The generic model is then applied to the recent shareholder incentive rulemaking for California energy efficiency programs. Our numerical analysis yields several findings. The first finding confirms the proposition: as either a utility firm or a customer coalition has more political clout, their proposals become less polarized. Second, as the public utilities commission exhibits more bias toward either of the two parties' proposals, their equilibrium proposals become less polarized and converge towards the preferred incentive mechanism of the party that benefits. Third, the structure of earnings/savings opportunities built into the programs allows social efficiency to be better achieved by strengthening the political clout of the customer coalition rather than that of the utility firm.
In Section 2 of the paper, we review the previous literature on interestgroup politics and discuss research background. Section 3 develops the formal model for proposal-based rulemaking. Section 4 then extends the model to examine the rulemaking of the shareholder incentive mechanism for California energy efficiency programs. Finally, Section 5 reviews important findings presented in the paper and, by pointing out limitations, discusses implications of the model.
Literature Review and Background
Rent seeking or, equivalently, the competition for "artificially contrived" transfers, typically involves the expenditure of resources (Tollison, 1982) . While conventional welfare models for monopoly, for instance, regard the monopoly rent merely as a lump-sum transfer from consumers to monopolists, rent-seeking theory asserts that any resources spent to capture the monopoly right, to some extent, dissipate the rent in the form of welfare loss (Tullock, 1967) . In contrast to this normative approach, positive economic theory has been explicit not only in attributing the resource expenditures to political competition of interest groups but also in predicting the behavior of the interest groups and associated policy outcomes (Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983; Austen-Smith & Wright, 1992) .
The simplest version of the positive economic theory is the "capture theory" of regulation (Bernstein, 1955; Stigler, 1971) . Stigler (1971) made the most important contribution to the capture theory when he proposed that industry rent-seekers successfully capture policy makers and that regulation is thus designed primarily for their benefit. This capture theory was later generalized by Peltzman (1976) , who introduced the effect of opposition groups such as consumer coalitions on political decision making. Specifically, he suggested an economic theory of price regulation in which a vote-maximizing politician recognizes the tradeoff between the rents it authorizes to producers and the costs borne by consumers; the politician then asks the producers for persuasion expenditures to mitigate consumer opposition as a price for conferring the rent. In Peltzman's world, any policy outcome is therefore the product of a policymaking process in which conflicting interests are reconciled in such a way that political support for a politician is best served. While this school of thought does not necessarily presume that regulation will be biased towards producers' interests, its models predict that producers are more likely than consumers to exercise political clout by addressing the free ridership problems and thus to acquire greater regulatory resources (Olson, 1965) .
Stimulated by the advances made by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) , Becker (1983) took a novel approach to describing competing interests struggling to influence policy making. Abstracting from the behavior of a politician, he proposed a theory in which interest groups-producers and consumerscompete for political influence: given its technology of political influence and its rival's political effort, each interest group chooses an optimal level of effort for political influence to maximize its wealth. Becker (1983) suggested that interest groups that are harmed by efficiency-damaging regulation will have an inherent advantage in the political competition. Another important contribution to interest-group competition theory was made by Austen-Smith & Wright (1992) . By proposing a "counteractive lobbying" hypothesis, the authors showed theoretical and empirical evidence that while interest groups lobby politicians who are predisposed to vote against them, in some cases they also lobby politicians aligned with them to counteract the lobbying efforts of opposing groups (Austen-Smith & Wright, 1992 .
However, while these studies have provided useful insights into interestgroup politics, most of the scholars have explicitly, or implicitly, been concerned with the effect of interest groups' lobbying on policymaking in legislatures. They have been largely unconcerned with the effects of such lobbying on bureaucratic rulemaking arising in large and growing executive branches such as federal or state agencies (notable exceptions are Furlong & Kerwin (2004) and McKay and Yackee (2007) ). As McKay and Yackee (2007) pointed out, this lack of scholarly attention to interest-group lobbying in executive-branch rulemaking is surprising, given that there is an established legal institution, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and its "notice and comment" provision, which requires agencies to make their proposed rules available and to solicit comments from the public before adopting them. This requirement legally mandates opportunity for interest groups to actively participate in the agency rulemaking process. In fact, Furlong (1997)'s survey revealed that the participation of interest groups in rulemaking is more important than several other lobbying strategies, and that those groups consider their efforts to be effective in influencing agencies' decision making.
Involvement of interest groups in agency rulemaking can be valuable also to agencies themselves. This is because agencies are often less informed about issues relevant to them than interest groups are and have an interest in acquiring the information in order to make reasonable decisions (van Winden, 1997; Hrebenar, 1997) . Agencies may be uncertain about how a particular regulation will work once implemented, and interest groups may play a key role in helping to reduce the agencies' uncertainty. Another perspective is that agencies are induced to accommodate interest groups' concerns because they are uncertain about how the public will react to the regulation: interest groups or individual citizens can sound "fire alarms," which may lead to situations in which the agencies have to defend themselves in the courts, and ultimately Congress may be forced to intervene (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Schmidt, 2002) . That is, in order to avoid public criticism, agencies will pay attention to interest groups' preferences revealed during rulemaking process.
Whatever the reason may be, such a deliberative and accommodative rulemaking approach will be increasingly pervasive as social development is pushing government systems into the direction of negotiation through decentralized alliances and away from command-and-control through hierarchical authority structures (Goodin et al., 2006) . Understanding interest-group politics is likely to have increasing significance in the literature because agencies will become less effective in devising regulations by themselves as demand for more sophisticated regulations increases due to heightened public awareness of agency rulemaking (Balla, 2005) and rapid technological changes throughout society.
Among a variety of agency rulemaking processes that accommodate public inputs, we focus on a common class of processes that requires interest groups to discuss with each other and to propose their preferred regulatory details before the agency finalizes the rulemaking. We will call these processes proposal-based rulemaking. This type of rulemaking often involves a series of rulemaking workshops and hearings, in which agencies hear the various rationales offered by interest groups to demonstrate the validity of their own proposals and observe the interest groups' opposition to the potential adverse impacts of proposals made by their political rivals.
One of the most recent and notable examples for proposal-based rulemaking can be found in the rulemaking of the shareholder incentive mechanism for utility-delivered energy efficiency programs in California, which will be discussed more in detail in Section 4. During the rulemaking process, the statewide regulatory agency, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), directed interest groups to meet, confer, and submit their proposals for incentive mechanisms before and after a series of workshops held in June 2006.
2 Evidentiary hearings were also held in May 2007 to address disputed factual issues of the proposals.
3 Interestingly, during the rulemaking process, investor-owned utilities such as PG&E (Pacific Gas & Electric Company) and SCE (Southern California Edison Company) proposed incentive rates for their shareholders ranging from 20% to 25% (with the achievement of energy savings targets), which are far below their preferred incentive rate, 100%.
4 The utilities presumably feared anticipated backlash from their customers, who might clamor for termination of the incentive mechanism.
Similarly, customer coalitions such as TURN (the Utility Reform Network) and DRA (the Division of Ratepayer Advocacy) asked for fairly trivial incentive rates ranging from 2% to 3%, which according to our analysis are lower than their preferred incentive rate.
5 By taking these proposals into account, the CPUC finalized in September 2007 an incentive mechanism that is characterized by the shareholder incentive rate of 12%. It appears that certain political dynamics between the utilities and the customer coalitions shaped their incentive-rate proposals and ultimately the incentive-rate decision made by the CPUC.
While such proposal-based rulemaking is a common and useful regulatory instrument for federal and state executive branches, there has been virtually no progress in understanding the proposals made by interest groups in agency rulemaking. In particular, no study has interpreted the interest groups' proposals in terms of their rent-seeking activities, competitive positions, political clout, or the characteristics of the agencies. This lack may stem from the belief that interest groups' proposals in agency rulemaking can be made effortlessly, with no consideration of other groups' reactions and agencies' predisposition, or the belief that knowing such proposals will not provide any prediction of regulatory outcomes.
In this paper, we employ the interest-group theory for policymaking in the legilsature to examine the implications of the proposals made by interest groups in agency rulemaking. However, we depart from Austen-Smith & Wright's (1992) interpretation of one group's lobbying to influence the legislator's voting choice being a response to the actions of its political rival. Instead, we portray one group's proposal to affect the agency's ultimate decision as a response to its rival's proposal. While Becker (1983) assumed that the legislator's voting choice is endogenously determined by political efforts made by wealth-maximizing interest groups, we hypothesize that, in agency rulemaking, ultimate regulatory decisions are based both on the proposals made by wealth-maximizing interest groups and on the agency's revealed predisposition in rulemaking. Even more importantly, our approach is explicit in the description of political effort made by interest groups, which in the previous literature have mostly been either unrelated to their rival's response or even ad hoc. Specifically, we identify each group's required level of political effort associated with its proposal as the level that eliminates its rival's political resistance to the proposal as represented by the rival's potential utility loss implied by the proposal. We suggest that proposals made by interest groups can play a far more important role in agency rulemaking than is generally understood, and can be an appropriate medium to develop a broader theory of policy decision making.
THE PROPOSAL GAME
We make two hypotheses, which provide a foundation for the positive economic model that will follow. Our first hypothesis is that, in an agency rulemaking process that requires interest groups to propose their preferred regulatory details and to communicate with each other, the proposals made by the interest groups are in political equilibrium. The proposals reflect the levels of the individual groups' political effort and are thus not simply "cheap talk," in that each group in its proposal balances a greater rent derivable from proposing more advantageous "rules of the game" with the greater political effort that it will have to make to eliminate the resultant stronger opposition of other groups: as the proposals become more polarized, the political effort made by individual groups to defend their proposals becomes greater. This hypothesis is partly supported by Holyoke's finding that, for an interest group, expectations of opposition from other competing groups are a significant factor in promoting its lobbying activities (Holyoke, 2003) . Such a counteractive political effort can take the form of preparing for and participating in a series of regulatory hearings and workshops to exert political pressure in the agency rulemaking, which obviously incurs to the interest group opportunity costs such as lost business opportunities associated with reallocating its limited resources and time.
In particular, we assume that each interest group makes a political effort along with its own proposal so that the proposal will not antagonize the rivals and will thus be seriously taken into account by agencies. That is, an interest group's proposal will not suffice to ensure the agencies' attention unless the group supports the proposal with an appropriate level of counteractive political effort. In our model, the agency circumvents potential ex-post public criticism by setting up a ground rule, namely, the balance of interest-group forces, according to which important issues may be fought out.
Our second hypothesis is that agencies have bias in the judgment of the proposals made by interest groups and the bias is revealed by either their prior decisions or by communications during the rulemaking process. In this connection, institutional literature suggests that states can be conceptualized not only as structures that shape the pattern of policy implementation and the access of various interest groups, but also as actors that behave according to their own ideas regarding good government or according to other interests (Skocpol, 1980; Immergut, 2006 ). In our model, such regulatory bias is revealed a priori to the interest groups and thus influences their lobbying behavior. Prior regulatory decisions play an important role because they can impart a lasting legacy to the rulemaking process by influencing the formation of expectations held by the interest groups, which in turn can affect their mobilization and rent-seeking behavior (Tollison, 1982; Immergut, 2006) . What follows logically from the two hypotheses is that any regulatory decision is shaped by the groups' costly proposals and agencies' own judgement of the proposals, or, rather, the extent to which the agencies favor one group over the other.
Let us now consider the following problem, which we will call the proposal game. Two groups, say S and T , having conflicting interests over a policy variable,r, participate in the proposal-based rulemaking process that requires them to propose their preferred levels of that variable. The utility of group S and group T is denoted as S(r) and T(r), respectively, both of which are strictly concave, so that Srr < 0 and Trr < 0. Due to the conflicting interests, S(r) and T(r) exhibit contrasting first-order effects, such that Sr > 0 and Tr < 0. That is, higherr leads to higher S(r), while resulting in lower T(r). In the process, group S and group T propose s and t (t < s), respectively, and the agency reconciles the two proposals by taking their weighted mean, which is represented asr
where ω (0 ≤ ω ≤ 1) is the agency' bias toward group T 's proposal, t.
We assume that the levels of the proposals do not affect the agency's bias, that is, ω is constant over s and t. This assumption can be valid if both of the two groups make a political effort up to the level that is required to prevent any further political confrontation associated with their proposals and thus to have the proposals receive adequate political attention from the agency. Note that this study analyzes the case in which such political effort requirement is always fulfilled.
Let us be more explicit in interpreting the political effort requirement for ensuring the agency's attention. The proposal game model identifies that each group's required level of political effort associated with its proposal is the one that eliminates its rival's political resistance to that proposal. Specifically, it is assumed that one group's political resistance emerges from the group's utility loss implied by the rival's proposal; and the greater the implied loss to one group, the stronger the group's political resistance to its rival's proposal. For example, with group S's choice of s, group T 's proposal of t (< s) incurs implied loss, S(s) − S(t), to group S; and group S's political resistance to proposal t becomes stronger as S(s)−S(t) rises.
6 The main idea is that if one group is to make a certain proposal that incurs a greater implied loss to its political rival, the group must make a greater political effort to eliminate the rival's political resistance and to gain the agency' attention. This perspective is consistent with the general finding that an interest group with large stakes in influencing policy decisions is likely to be politically active (Potters & Sloof, 1996) .
Note also that each group's resistance-eliminating effort associated with its proposal will obviously incur political costs. To incorporate such political costs into utility representation, we make the intuitive assumption that one group's political costs associated with its proposal are proportional to its rival's implied loss incurred by that proposal. Then we introduce a multiplier, called the political effectiveness, which converts one group's implied loss to the political costs borne by its rival. Therefore, one group's political costs are proportional to its rival's implied loss with the rate of the rival's political effectiveness. The interpretation is that as one group's political effectiveness increases (decreases), the group's implied loss incurred by its rival's proposal becomes more (less) effective in inducing that rival to make a more hospitable proposal in the agency rulemaking. In general, an interest group will have greater political effectiveness if it is better at controlling its members' free riding incentives to shirk their political obligations (Olson, 1965) or if the group is more effective in convicing its political rival of the adverse impact of its implied loss.
Given all of these, group S will choose its proposal, s, to maximize
6 Likewise, given group T 's choice t, group S's proposal s (> t) incurs an implied loss, T(t) − T(s), to group T . Also, group T 's political resistance to s becomes stronger as
Also, group T will choose its proposal, t, to maximize
We call δ S and δ T the political effectiveness of group S and group T . Now the problem boils down to the determination of a Nash-Cournot set of proposals.
The comparative static questions of interest in this proposal game are how each group will strategically interact with the other in its proposal and how the levels of Nash-Cournot equilibrium proposals, (s * , t * ), will change with δ S , δ T , or ω, holding all else constant. To derive the comparative statics, we first derive the first-order optimality conditions for (2) and (3) by treating each player's decision problem in isolation and then determine the equilibrium proposals. The two optimality conditions are given, respectively, as
The second-order sufficiency conditions are fulfilled due to the assumed concavity of S and T. Equation (4) indicates that group S will raise its proposal s away from t until the marginal benefit of proposing higher s, and thereby of affecting the policy makers' choice, equals the associated marginal political cost of defending the proposal. Similarly, Equation (5) indicates that group T will lower its proposal t away from s until the marginal benefit of proposing lower t equals the associated marginal political cost. Let us now examine a Nash-Courtnot equilibrium, which will be denoted as (t
The equilibrium requires each player to choose its best response to the other's choice under any circumstances. We thus solve the systems of the first-order optimality conditions, (4) and (5), which are represented henceforth as F (s * , t * ; δ S , δ T , ω) = 0 and G(s * , t * ; δ S , δ T , ω) = 0, respectively. Totally differentiating the equations gives
These equations can be simultaneously used to determine how an incremental change in δ S , δ T , or ω will affect (s * , t * ). Solving the effects of δ S and δ T presents the following proposition. This proposition is illustrated in Figure 1 . Group S's best response curve is negatively sloped because an increase in t lowers the marginal benefit of proposing higher s due to the concavity of S: the higher the level of t, the less efficacious is an increase in s. Group T 's best response curve is also negatively sloped because an increase in s raises the marginal benefit of proposing lower t due to the concavity of T: the higher the level of s, the more efficacious is an decrease in t. These relationships are confirmed by the fact that the slope of group S's best response curve equals −(∂F/∂t)/(∂F/∂s) (< 0) and that of group T 's best response curve equals −(∂G/∂s)/(∂G/∂t) (< 0). Note that group T 's curve is steeper than group S's because the stability of the equilibrium requires (∂F/∂s)(∂G/∂t) > (∂F/∂t)(∂G/∂s) (see Appendix).
Suppose, for instance, the status quo equilibrium has been established at e * 0 . As group S becomes more effective in politics or, equivalently, as δ S rises, group T will have a greater marginal cost of proposing lower t (due to ∂ 2 Π T /∂δ S ∂t > 0), which causes its best response curve to be shifted outward from t * 0 to t * 1 . For group S, this change implies a lowered marginal benefit of proposing higher s (due to ∂ 2 Π S /∂t∂s < 0), which induces its best response curve to be shifted downward from s * 0 to s * 1 . Consequently, a new equilibrium is attained at e * 1 , which constitutes a less-polarized set of proposals and thus results in a lower political cost than e * 0 does. In the same manner, as group T becomes more effective in politics or, equivalently, as δ T rises, group S's best response curve will be shifted downward from s * 0 to s * 1 (due to ∂ 2 Π S /∂δ T ∂s < 0), which causes T 's best response curve to be shifted outward from t * 0 to t * 1 (due to ∂ 2 Π T /∂s∂t < 0). Again, a less-polarized and lower-political-cost equilibrium is established at e * 1 . A reasonable extension of Proposition 1 is that if both of the two groups are sufficiently effective in politics, they will make the same proposal in the rulemaking process of setting policy variabler. The intuitive explanation is as follows. As both δ S and δ T rise, the two groups' proposals must become less polarized to fulfill Proposition 1. When both δ S and δ T reach sufficiently high levels, however, neither of the two groups will find that making a proposal different from its rival's will produce a return that is greater than the associated political costs. Thus the two groups make the same proposal, reaching a virtual consensus over the policy variable. This case is summarized in the following corollary to Proposition 1: Corollary 1. A consensus over a policy variable can be made a priori by two groups with conflicting interests over the variable if both of them are sufficiently effective in politics.
This corollary is demonstrated in Figure 2 . The figure depicts the efficient set of indifference curves for group S and group T , denoted as, respectively, I S l and I T l , under the assumption that neither of them are sufficiently effective in politics. Note that any indifference curve for group S will have a convex upper contour set because as t falls, the group must raise s more than proportionately so that it can reap the same level of utility; any indifference curve for group T will also have a convex upper contour set due to the same reason. As shown in Figure 2 , I S l and I T l establish the polarized equilibrium of e * l at their point of tangency, while obviously costing both groups political costs during the rulemaking process. Now suppose that both of the two groups become more effective in politics. Their indifference curves will then tilt more toward the 45-degree line to account for associated increases in political costs, resulting in a less-polarized set of proposals. With sufficiently , cross with each other at the consensus equilibrium e * h , without any wasteful political costs being incurred. Proposition 1 and its corollary have significance for the role of agencies in the proposal-based rulemaking. Although, with experience, any interest group may become more effective in conterbalancing its rival's attempt to influence agency decision by, for example, controlling its members' free riding incentives, the agency may be able to help the interest groups gain more political clout, to the extent that the associated policy outcome is expected to achieve greater social efficiency. The agency can do so by holding a series of official round-table meetings in which the interest groups are required to participate and exchange their views. The agency can also signal that they pay serious attention to each group's reactions to its rival's proposal. This may take the form of the agency's practice of postponing its decision until it receives proposals that do not provoke noticeable political confrontation. By playing these moderating roles, the agency may enable the interest groups to gain more political clout, eventually lessening or even eliminating wasteful political competition between them in the rulemaking process.
The proposal-game model, however, does not present a clear-cut compar-ative statics regarding the agency's weight on proposals, ω. This is so because the impacts of ω on equilibrium proposals will rely on the specifications of the utility functions in place. The impacts, along with other questions, are addressed in the specific context of California's incentive rulemaking process below.
THE INCENTIVE RULEMAKING IN CALIFORNIA
The above section has presented a positive economic model that predicts how two groups with conflicting interest over a policy variable will make proposals for that variable during deliberative and accommodative rulemaking process. In light of the model, we now elucidate the rulemaking of shareholder incentive mechanism for utility-delivered energy efficiency programs in California, in which interest groups were in fact required to communicate with each other and to make proposals for the incentive mechanisms. The model suggests that the current incentive mechanism may not have been exogenously determined by the CPUC but rather endogenously established by the proposal game of the rent-seeking groups during the rulemaking process.
Among several important features of incentive mechanism proposals made by interest groups (e.g., minimum performance standard, definition of performance, earnings cap, etc.), this study focuses exclusively on proposals for a shareholder incentive rate (i.e., a rate that specifies how large a share of net program benefit should be given to the utility shareholders in return for the utilities' management of customer-funded energy efficiency programs.) This is not only because the incentive rate is the most sensitive parameter in determining the stakeholders' earnings/savings opportunities that can be created by the implementation of the programs, but also because, as pointed out above, they showed most pronounced differences in the proposed specifications of an incentive rate during the rulemaking process.
The proposed positive economic model, however, may place some limitations on the description of the interest-group politics over the determination of an incentive rate due to the model's simplifying assumption that the groups' utility functions are all monotone in the policy variable. Our theoretical finding discussed in Eom & Sweeney (2009) is that while the utility firms' net incentive earnings on energy efficiency programs are increasing and monotone in an incentive rate, the customers' associated energy bill savings are decreasing and not necessarily monotone-in fact, given any not unreasonable misrepresentation of the programs, there exists a global maximum point for the bill savings function. The results are theoretically intuitive because such a higher-than-minimum incentive rate can increase net program benefit by lowering required customer funds for the programs, which more than offsets the associated reduction in the net-benefit share to the customers. It follows that while the utility firms' preference is the highest possible incentive rate, the customers' preference may not be the lowest possible incentive rate; this is not the case for the proposal-game model, in which one group prefers the lowest level, whereas the other prefers the highest level.
Moreover, the positive economic model presumes that there are only two groups with conflicting interests and does not accommodate the situation in which more than two groups compete with each other, which, in fact, took place in the California incentive rulemaking. Consequently, the comparative statics suggested by the positive economic model, which is based on the two competing groups with well-behaved utility functions, may not be workable in the California case.
The purpose of the subsequent analysis is to illustrate to political scientists and policy analysts how the positive economic model based on the political equilibrium hypothesis can be employed to predict incentive-rate proposals made by stakeholders of California energy efficiency programs. The purpose is not to modify the proposed positive economic model in such a way that the model can accommodate complex interactions of multiple interest groups both with conflicting interests in the determination of an incentive rate and with non-monotone utility representations. Thus the numerical results of the simple positive economic model, particularly concerning the levels of incentive-rate proposals, should be interpreted only as an example of the framework's output.
To provide useful insights into the incentive rulemaking, we pay most attention to comparative statics based on the functional specifications developed in our economic model for energy efficiency programs, which is elaborated in Eom & Sweeney (2009) . Here the comparative statics refer to the way that the stakeholders' equilibrium proposals change in response to changes in major parametric variables. We do the analysis by identifying the rulemaking process in terms of the interaction of only two representative parties with conflicting interests, ignoring how groups with aligned interests and their members will cooperate or interact with each other in response to their political rivals' behavior, which is a question beyond the scope of this research. We simplify by placing the multiple interest groups involved in the rulemaking process into two parties: a utility firm (or high-incentive-rate advocate) and a customer coalition (or low-incentive-rate advocate). Despite the existence of other interest groups (e.g., environmental advocacy groups) and its associated political interactions, this dichotomy is illuminating because the stakes of the utility firm and its customers (but not necessarily those of other groups) can be inversely coupled regarding the CPUC's choice of an incentive rate. The two parties in effect made incentive rate proposals that were diametrically opposed to each other.
7
The same hypotheses as in the above proposal-game model are fulfilled throughout this section. The first hypothesis is that the two parties' proposals for incentive rates are in political equilibrium: each party balances a greater rent that can be produced by proposing a more advantageous incentive rate with the greater political effort that it will have to make to defend that proposal or, equivalently, to receive adequate political attention from the CPUC. The second hypothesis is that the CPUC determines an incentive rate based on its judgment of the two parties' proposals and its bias in the judgment is known to them a priori. Regarding the reglatory bias, it is useful to recognize that the CPUC consists of appointed commissioners, not elected ones, so that the CPUC is likely to constitute an important third party that pursues its own policy agenda.
8 If these hypotheses hold, each party will propose in such a way that the marginal benefit of proposing a more advantageous incentive rate, and thereby of influencing the CPUC's decision, equals the associated marginal political costs of defending that proposal.
Consistent with these hypotheses, the CPUC wrote "establishing the level of earnings opportunity for a shareholder risk/reward incentive mechanism is ultimately a judgment call that the Commission must make, and not a precise science" and "today's adopted minimum performance standard represents a reasonable compromise among the competing positions and meets our objectives."
9 . Also, the CPUC has consistently exhibited its commitment to advancing state-wide energy efficiency over the last several decades and even throughout the rulemaking process under consideration.
10
The last, but not the least, caveat is that the subsequent analysis does not take into account potential information asymmetry between the utility firm and the customer coalition. Even in the simplest case where only the firm's effectiveness in program management is private information, comprehensive analysis is impeded by the motivation of the firm to make use of its informational advantage not only in its request for program funds, but also in the incentive rulemaking: the firm may deliberately misrepresent its effectiveness in program management and ultimately its earnings opportunities, in an attempt to manipulate the customer coalition into claiming a more lenient incentive rate than it would have with complete information. Since the main analytic focus is not to identify the implications of information asymmetry, but rather to illustrate the proposal-based incentive rulemaking process, we assume throughout this section that, over the rulemakign process, all of the stakeholders hold the same set of information, namely, the same assessment on their respective welfare improvement. Now we stipulate key functions relevant to the analysis of the California case. A utility firm and a customer coalition participate in the rulemaking process of setting a shareholder incentive rate ofr such that r min ≤r ≤ 1, where r min is the lower bound of feasible incentive rates guaranteeing that the firm's program management will achieve the agency-set energy savings target, while bringing non-negative net earnings to the firm and non-negative bill savings to the customers. According to Eom & Sweeney (2009) , net earnings to the firm U(r) and bill savings to the customers V(r) are given as follows:
See pp.27 and 104 of the CPUC Decision 07-09-043, "Interim Opinion on Phase I Issues: Shareholder Risk/Reward Incentive Mechanism for Energy Efficiency Programs."
10 One of the State's major policy drivers for energy efficiency, the Energy Action Plan, supports the "loading order," which identifies energy efficiency and demand response as the state's most preferred means of meeting growing energy needs. The Energy Action Plan requires actions that "provide utilities with demand response and energy efficiency investment rewards comparable to the return on investment in new power and transmission projects" (Energy Action Plan 2003).
where η, θ, β, andt represent the marginal energy savings benefit, and the firm's effectiveness in program management, the size of the customer base, and per-customer energy savings target, respectively.
Similar to what happens in the proposal game case, the utility firm and the customer coalition propose r F and r C (r min ≤ r C ≤ r F ≤ 1), respectively, and the CPUC reconciles the two proposals by taking their weighted mean, which is given asr (r C , r
where ω (0 ≤ ω ≤ 1) is the agency's bias. Recognizing this, the firm chooses its proposal, r F , to maximize
Likewise, the customer coalition chooses its proposal, r C , to maximize
δ F and δ C are referred to as the political effectiveness of the utility firm and the customer coalition. Note that, in these expressions, one party's political costs to eliminate its rival's political resistance are quadratic in the rival's implied loss, not linear as in the proposal game case. Such a modification is necessary to ensure that the two groups' net rents from the proposal politics, namely, (9) and (10), will be concave in decision variables over reasonable ranges of model parameters. The quadratic modification also accounts for the idea that each party's political effort, as a non-marketable productive factor, must be made by the party itself with the adjustment of its organizational and financial resources, which are generally binding. Figure 3 illustrates each party's proposal and the associated implied loss borne by its rival, under the realistic circumstance that program parameters offer ample flexibility in the choice of an incentive rate (i.e., under η 3 θt > 8), so that bill savings to the customers are convex and non-monotone with an incentive rate (Eom & Sweeney, 2009 ). Given the customer coalition's proposal r C , the utility firm's decision r F incurs the implied loss in the customers' bill savings L C , which must be offset by the utility firm's political effort costing it C . In contrast, given the firm's proposal r F , the customer coalition's decision r C incurs the implied loss in the utility shareholders' net earnings L F , which must be offset by the customer coalition's political effort costing it as much as (δ C /2)L 2 F . Nash-Cournot equilibrium proposals are obtained by deriving each group's best response curve and thus finding out a fixed point at which every party's proposal is identical with its best response proposal with respect to its rival's proposal. To look into the California case in light of the proposal game model, we suppose the reference case in which a utility firm with the program management efficiency (θ) of 0.25 [GWh annual savings squared/$million cubed] participates in the incentive rulemaking for energy efficiency programs with the per-customer energy savings target (t) of 0.6 [MWh annual savings], which will be implemented in the service territory with the marginal energy savings benefit (η) of 0.70 [$million/GWh annual savings] and the customer size (β) of 5.0 millions.
11 In addition, the reference case arbitrarily assumes that the CPUC equally weights the parties' proposals, namely, ω=0.5, and that the political effectiveness of both parties is 0.005 [1/$million]. With this political effectiveness, each party must make a political effort costing it $1 million to defend a proposal implying a $20 million loss to its rival. Possible misrepresentation of the base case is addressed by sensitivity analysis. Figure 4 shows the utility firm's best response curve, r F (r C ), and the customer coalition's best response curve, r C (r F ). These two response curves intersect at the single point, r C e =0.20 and r F e =0.32, which are called the NashCournot equilibrium proposals.
12 Given the equilibrium, the CPUC will choose their middle point, the incentive rate of 26%, which eventually creates an about $1,220 million net social benefit, including the two parties' political costs. Because the conventional normative analysis would have predicted the maximum net social benefit of about $1,250 with the efficient incentive rate of 27%, the rulemaking process and the associated rent-seeking politics can be said to result in $30 million loss in the net social benefit.
Sensitivity analyses of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium proposals with regard to key parameters present several findings. First, an increase in the political effectiveness of either party makes both of them less polarized in their proposals, which is illustrated by Figures 5 and 6: this finding is consistent with Proposition 1, which is derived from generic functional representations. Figure 5 points out that as the firm becomes more politically effective, the customer coalition raises its incentive rate proposal more than the firm is induced to raise its own incentive rate proposal, which results in less polarization in equilibrium proposals and in an ultimate higher adopted incentive rate. This is because the firm's implied loss incurred by the customer coalition's proposal becomes more effective in inducing the coalition to make a more hospitable proposal; this is more so when the firm's political effectiveness is relatively low and thus the equilibrium proposals are established around the concave plateau region of the coalition's welfare function, in which case the coalition can mitigate the impact of the firm being more politically effective by making a large increase in its proposal without a substantial loss in its welfare.
12 Note thta the equilibrium proposals differ considerably from the actual proposals made by the stakeholders. Among several simplifying, but necessary, model assumptions that may have caused this difference, we conjecture that the symmetric information assumption may have played a major role: the stakeholders may have different assessment on their respective welfare impacts. Future research may consider examining the implications information asymmetry has for the proposal-based rulemaking process. Likewise, Figure 6 indicates that as the customer coalition becomes more effective in politics, the firm lowers its proposal more than the customer coalition is induced to, which leads to less polarization in equilibrium proposals and a lower adopted incentive rate. Namely, the primary effect of one party's political effectiveness on its rival's proposal is greater than its secondary effect on its own proposal. These findings suggests that establishment of equilibrium proposals with relatively low levels of incentive rate, as was in the California case, may be indicative of effective politics of the customer coalition in the incentive rulemaking process.
Note, however, that less polarization in equilibrium proposals does not necessarily lead to a lower social loss associated with the rent-seeking politics when compared to the normative efficient outcome. This is because the social loss is determined not only by the degree of polarization in equilibrium proposals, but also by the associated policy outcome, that is, an adopted incentive rate. Less polarization may result in a greater social loss if it results in a policy outcome that is very different from the socially efficient level and thus lowers the net social benefit more than the avoided political costs. In contrast, less polarization may substantially reduce the social loss if, in addition to already contributing to lower political costs, it results in a policy outcome that is close to the socially optimal level. These contrasting impacts are displayed in Figure 5 and Figure 6 . As shown, while an increase in the utility firm's political effectiveness δ F leads to less polarization by raising the social loss, an increase in the customer coalition's political effectiveness δ C does the same by reducing the social loss. Thus the positive economic model, given all the hypotheses and assumptions, suggests that it would be socially desirable to have more effective customer politics rather than more effective utility politics.
This study also reveals that as the CPUC signals more bias toward either of the two parties' proposals, their equilibrium proposals become less polarized and converge towards the preferred incentive rate of the party that benefits. This comparative statics result is illustrated in Figure 7 . The intuition is that if the CPUC favors either of the two parties, the favored party will be encouraged to make a proposal more advantageous to itself to account for its increased efficacy in affecting the regulatory decision, whereas the ri-val will be induced to make a less hostile proposal to account for its lowered efficacy in affecting the regulatory decision. This finding, in turn, suggests that less polarization in the equilibrium proposals, as was in the California case, may be indicative of greater regulatory bias in the rulemaking process.
Furthermore, as is shown in Figure 7 , less polarization in equilibrium proposals does not necessarily lead to less economic distortion. While less polarization associated with greater regulatory bias toward the customer coalition tends to reduce the social loss, less polarization associated with greater regulatory bias toward the utility firm only intensifies the loss. Therefore, from the social efficiency point of view, the customer coalition's proposal may require a preferential treatment by the CPUC.
CONCLUSIONS
This study proposes a positive economic model with which to describe a class of rulemaking processes that require two groups with conflicting interests to communicate with each other and to propose their preferred policy implementation details before an agency finalizes the rulemaking on the basis of the proposals. To do so, we hypothesize that the proposals are in political equilibrium: each group balances a greater rent derivable from making a more advantageous proposal with the greater political effort required to defend that proposal; the agency determines a policy based on their judgment of the groups' proposals, and the bias in the judgment is known to the interest groups a priori. Thus, in our model, the agency circumvents potential ex-post public criticism by setting up a ground rule, namely, the balance of interestgroup forces, according to which the policy issue is fought out. Specifically, we assume that each group's required level of political effort associated with its proposal is the level that eliminates its rival's political resistance: this political resistance increases both with the rival's implied utility loss associated with the proposal and with the rival's political effectiveness.
The comparative statics analysis of the positive economic model predicts that an increase in the political effectiveness of either interest group will make both of them less polarized in their proposals, resulting in lower political costs incurred over the proposal politics. The analysis also suggests that a consensus over a policy variable can be made a priori by the two groups if both of them are sufficiently effective in politics. That is, effectuating interest groups' politics in the agency rulemaking process may turn a noncooperative mood between the two groups into a virtually cooperative one, with the effect of lowered wasteful political costs and potential promotion of social efficiency. Somewhat paradoxically, this suggests that the agency may be warranted to assist the interest groups in gaining more political clout if the resultant policy outcome is expected to achieve social efficiency. The positive economic model is then applied to illustrate the incentive rulemaking process of shaping the shared-savings incentive mechanism for California energy efficiency programs. Earnings/savings opportunities of the programs, which may not behave as ideally as the above generic model, are taken into account to predict the proposal politics between a utility firm and a customer coalition over an incentive rate for the mechanism. The sensitivity analysis results show that, as in the generic proposal game case, an increase in the political effectiveness of either the utility firm or the customer coalition makes both less polarized in their proposals. The results further reveal that as the CPUC exhibits more bias toward either of the two proposals, the proposals become less polarized and converge towards the preferred incentive rate of the favored party. Put differently, either the political ineffectiveness of both parties or a neutral regulatory stance on their proposals can incur greater political costs, which impede the efficient delivery of the programs.
It should be remembered, however, that social efficiency is not necessarily promoted by the empowerment of either party or the agency's signaling of preferential regulatory treatment. Rather, the social efficiency must be considered in comparison with the normatively efficient solution that would have been established under the rent-seeking opportunities perceived by the stakeholders. The investigation of California energy efficiency programs suggests that, given all the above hypotheses and assumptions, the structure of earnings/savings opportunities built into the programs would allow social efficiency to be better achieved by strengthening the political clout of the customer coalition, rather than that of the utility firm: recall that, in the California case, the customers' preferred level of incentive rate is closer to the socially efficient level than the firm's preferred level is. Thus, from a social efficiency point of view, the customer coalition may need to become more effective in politics and its proposal may require a preferential treatment by the CPUC.
While agencies' requests for proposals that present policy implementation details is now a common rulemaking practice, there has been little progress in modeling the politics of the proposals made by stakeholders. Understanding such politics will have increasing significance since agencies will presumably become less effective in devising regulations by themselves, as demand for more sophisticated regulations increases due to both heightened public awareness of agency rulemaking (Balla, 2005) and rapid technological changes throughout society. We believe the positive economic model presented in this study contributes to the political economy literature by providing a reasonable analytic framework with which to analyze the politics of proposals made by stakeholders in deliberative and accommodative rulemaking process. Empirical tests of the political equilibrium hypothesis and the associated positive economic model appear to be a reasonable avenue for future research.
The progress in modeling the politics of proposals has, however, been made at the expense of several simplifying assumptions. This model presumes that two groups with conflicting interests compete with each other over a single policy variable and therefore does not accommodate general circumstances in which various groups with different interests compete over multiple policy variables. This model also stays away from the important political economy questions: How could each coalition produce political influence as a public good by effectively addressing the free ridership problems prevailing within the coalition? Where does the political support for the agency come from, and what goal is the agency pursuing? What would happen with information asymmetry between the stakeholders? A more general model would incorporate these questions into the prediction of proposal equilibriums that are established in the agency rulemaking process.
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let us consider the comparative statics of δ i (i ∈ {S, T }), which are represented in matrix notation as To derive the condition for ensuring that the equilibrium proposals will be stable, we consider the dynamic game in which each group chooses its proposal in any period, given the other's proposal in the previous period (Becker, 1983) .
13 If the proposals in the previous period deviate from the equilibrium levels by ds n−1 and dt n−1 , the best-responding conditions for group S and T suggested by (6) and (7) These straightforward results prove the proposition. Q.E.D.
